Introduction
Most of the recent armed violence is carried out by non-state groups in areas such as Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Sri Lanka, with some differences between these situations. In the Libyan case, some people believe that the state is unable to protect its citizens and control its territory, and therefore it is up to the international community to do so. However, the Libyan situation has demonstrated how the international community can negatively impact the region and work controversially against U.N. efforts. Militias are one of the most serious problems, preventing the nation from achieving stability. Understanding the situation in Libya requires a neutral position, considering the causes of the conflict and supporting local, regional, and international reconciliation efforts.
When the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) was recognized by the U.N. and then supported by the U.S. in defeating the ISIS terrorist group, Libya successfully led the military forces to defeat ISIS in a six-month battle. Indeed, the situation in eastern Libya is worse, as it is ruled and controlled by a military regime, the Libyan National Army (LNA), a self-declared army, which receives funds from external supporters.
Who would believe all these human rights abuses in Libya after the February revolution? In Benghazi, as reported by Human Rights organizations and other local news outlets, the so-called Libyan National Army has committed numerous human rights abuses and violations, such as excessive use of force, lengthy pretrial detentions, limits on freedom of speech and press, arbitrary arrests and detentions, denial of fair public trials or executions without due process, intimidation, arbitrary interference with privacy and property rights, and confiscation of property without due process.
What exacerbates the situation is the external support for armed groups, directly or indirectly, by states like the UAE, France, and Russia, against all settlement efforts locally or internationally by Libyan neighbors and the U.N. While the U.N., local mediators, and regional intermediaries have done a great job in bringing all parties to the conflict to the table, external actors continue to support militias and other groups in eastern Libya. The Government of National Accord in Tripoli struggled to consolidate power, but it gained recognition from the U.N. in late 2015.[1]
This research paper will analyze the recent conflict in Libya, focusing on the extent to which all involved parties, including ISIS and other militias, are subject to Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law. It will also explore the implications of these legal frameworks on accountability and the potential for future reconciliation efforts.
Background
Libya is a parliamentary democracy with a temporary Constitutional Declaration of 2011, which allows for the exercise of a full range of political, civil, and judicial rights. The eruption of major political violence in July 2014 led to the loss of central government control over much of the country’s territory and the emergence of rival administrations based in Tripoli and the eastern city of Tobruk. As a consequence of the political failure and the absence of a Libyan Constitution, Libya has gone down a dark road, with everything seeming to work against any plans or attempts at stabilization.[2]
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The Changing of Libyan Situation Politically
To understand Libya’s case, we need to know the causes of the current situation. There are two major factors in explaining the conflict over the past few years: political failure and the absence of the Constitution. The political conflict between the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based General National Congress (GNC) continued throughout the year. Active fighting between the HoR-aligned Operation Dignity forces and GNC-aligned Operation Dawn forces remained a source of instability. On December 17, members of the UN-led Political Dialogue agreed to a political agreement in Morocco.[3] The Libyan Political Agreement created a nine-member Presidency Council, headed by Prime Minister Fayez Sarraj.
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Armed Conflict Over Power and Backed by Political Motives
The conflict erupted in May 2014 when Dignity leader Khalifa Hifter announced the launch of his campaign aimed at ridding eastern Libya of militias, beginning with Benghazi.[4] This offensive shattered a fragile status quo. Revolutionary forces concentrated in the city of Misrata, and group politicians perceived Hifter’s offensive as a direct affront. Following parliamentary elections that these factions lost, the Misrata bloc announced the launch of the Libya Dawn offensive, aimed at driving pro-Dignity forces out of Tripoli. More broadly, the Dawn Offensive was an effort to change facts on the ground to ensure that the Misrata-Islamist bloc retained political influence. The Dignity and Dawn offensives have contributed to the continuing political and geographic fragmentation of Libya. Libya now has two separate parliaments and governments, while much of the country has been carved into spheres of influence by warring factions. The Dignity-Dawn conflict has also caused a deterioration of security, which has played into the hands of various violent non-state actors, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates that have capitalized on Libya’s security vacuum to establish bases of operation. This report provides a blow-by-blow account of the military conflict between Dignity and Dawn forces, then assesses the implications of the Libyan civil war on regional security and potential policy options for Western States.
After the political failure in 2014, forces grouped into two divided government authorities, as well as armed groups and militias, committed serious violations and abuses of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Laws. Over three years of war, on several occasions, all parties to the conflict carried out indiscriminate attacks in densely populated areas, leading to the deaths of civilians in places like Benghazi, Darna, and Tripoli. Questions arose as to whether these militias and other warring groups have obligations under Human Rights and Humanitarian Laws. In other words, are these non-state actors bound by Human Rights rules?
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External Interference by Foreign Countries
Besides Syria, the Libyan case presents another complex example of external interference with state sovereignty. There is no doubt that money is a powerful weapon to corrupt and destroy any government system and interfere with its sovereignty. While UN efforts successfully helped establish the Government of National Accord, some states have supplied millions in support of militias and opposition groups like the LNA. Moreover, they provided weapons funding these armed groups. Militias and other groups allied with the LNA have arbitrarily arrested and indefinitely detained thousands of people.[5] These military groups have committed numerous serious violations of Humanitarian Law, local laws, and international laws in general. In May 2017, the ICC issued an arrest warrant and called on the Libyan National Army (LNA) to surrender senior commander Al-Werfalli to ICC custody.[6]
Non-State Armed Groups: Their Role in the Recent Libyan Conflict
Traditionally, the state is mainly responsible under international law; however, recent cases have brought attention and discussions to Human Rights obligations for non-state actors. This approach is widely observed in recent war situations like Syria and Libya. The term “Non-State Actor” is broadly used at the international level and does not provide a specific definition. It refers to a variety of force groups such as armed opposition groups, militias, other armed groups, and sometimes even terrorist groups. It is necessary to define the non-state actor and specify its role in the Libyan situation, especially in the recent conflict.
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Militias and Other Non-State Armed Groups’ Role in the Libyan Conflict
The term “militia” is commonly used in Libya to refer to any armed group of people who do not follow military rules, break laws, and use their power against civilians. In many cases, it refers to any armed group that has no respect for human rights and the rule of law, even when these groups have a military structure and training. In other words, Militias are armed groups that operate outside the formal control of the state military or government. These groups can be composed of private citizens or various organizations that take up arms to pursue specific political, social, or ideological objectives. Militias can range from local self-defense units to heavily armed and organized factions that challenge the state’s authority. They often operate in regions where the government has weak control or in areas of conflict, and their actions can significantly impact the stability and security of a nation.
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a militia is defined as “a group of private citizens who train for military duty in order to be ready to defend their state or country in times of emergency. A militia is distinct from regular military forces, which are units of professional soldiers maintained both in war and peace by the federal government.”[7]
Can we call a terrorist group a militia? Yes, it is a common usage by many people, but not all militias are terrorists, and there are slight differences between the two concepts. Thus, militias could serve as a national military force, and as an example, the US has some militias that serve in a military capacity. Sometimes, the term is used to describe any armed groups with an ideology that use excessive force against civilians, even if they serve as a government force. Thus, the LNA is known as a militia.
Since 2014, we have witnessed several incidents where militias like the LNA, Ansar Al-Sharia, Daesh, and others have committed unbelievable war crimes and crimes against humanity, including torture and the killing of prisoners and civilians. They have violated all laws and principles, especially International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights laws. However, the most critical and unacceptable acts are the war crimes and human rights abuses in Benghazi and Darna.[8]
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The Spread of Militias and Their Role in the Mass Situation
Similar to Syria and Yemen, Libya has struggled with various armed groups that have divided the government into areas of control and power. These conflicting groups and militias have exhausted the government during its transitional stage and engulfed the civilian population in grave violence. While some militias are nominally under the authority of the government, enjoying broad autonomy, others are rivals who have never trained as soldiers. Consequently, we have witnessed a series of armed groups operating and controlling detention facilities. The question arises as to whether all armed groups in the Libyan scene are militias, and therefore may be beyond government responsibility.[9]
Generally speaking, we need to distinguish between the recognition of the Government of National Accord by the UN and the rival and terrorist groups like ISIS. Rebels are national armed forces recognized as government forces that perform national service, such as Libya Dawn.[10]
By 2014, the ISIS group started taking control of part of Libyan territory, Sirte, and declared the Islamic State of Daesh rule under the extension of what’s called ISIS. This group committed serious inhuman crimes and crimes against humanity, such as bombing, killing, torture, and other human rights abuses. They have also committed numerous crimes against women’s rights, child treatment, and other violations. In the city of Sirte, many people were killed simply because they did not agree to work with or did not appear to support ISIS. While in Sirte, ISIS groups tried to take over oil facilities and continued to fight with revolutionary groups, especially rebel forces from Misrata city.
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The Impact on Libya
In Libya, militias are one of the most significant obstacles to achieving stability. The country has been plagued by various armed groups since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. These militias have filled the power vacuum left by the collapse of the central government, leading to ongoing conflict and instability.
Understanding the situation in Libya requires a neutral position that considers the underlying causes of the conflict, such as historical tribal rivalries, political fragmentation, and the influence of external actors. Effective support for Libya involves promoting local, regional, and international reconciliation efforts.
Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors
There is no doubt that International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is applicable at all times, whether during peacetime or conflict. International Human Rights deal with the inherent rights of persons to be protected at all times against abusive power. While it is well established that armed non-state groups are obligated by International Humanitarian Law (IHL), their obligations under Human Rights law are not as clear and remain controversial.[11] Besides the human rights abuses and violations during conflict, there are grave violations in other situations outside of conflict.
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Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups in Conflict Situations
To begin with, International Human Rights Law applies during times of armed conflict, though human rights efforts tend to be more intensive. Under Human Rights Law, the state has an obligation to prevent and investigate alleged violations, including those by non-state actors. However, many abuses were committed by non-state groups where the government was not active. Non-state armed groups are increasingly considered bound by international human rights law if they exercise de facto control over certain areas.[12] Traditionally, states were primarily responsible for human rights abuses, but this view has been extended to non-state armed groups that control and exercise power in conflict territories.[13] The International Court of Justice has formally confirmed on several occasions that HRL also applies in situations of armed conflict, whether international or non-international.[14]
In 2016 and 2017, Human Rights Watch reported repeated human rights abuses by militias under the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), which committed many serious violations. If we apply this rule, the LNA has full control of the area and exercises power freely, so they are obligated under human rights law. Additionally, applying the principle of command responsibility, it is well-established in articles 293 and 294 of Libyan Criminal Law that commanders are liable for actions committed by their subordinates.
Arbitrary arrest and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; denial of fair public trial or killing without seeing trail; an ineffective judicial system staffed by officials subject to intimidation; arbitrary interference with privacy and home; use of excessive force and other abuses in internal conflicts; limits on the freedoms of speech and press, including violence against, and harassment of, journalists; restrictions on freedom of religion; abuses of internally displaced persons, refugees, and migrants; corruption and lack of transparency in government; violence and social discrimination against women and ethnic and racial minorities, including foreign workers; trafficking in persons; legal and social discrimination based on sexual orientation; and violations of labor rights, including forced labor.[15] HRW 2016
Between June 2016 and July 2017, several videotapes appeared on social media implicating LNA fighters in summary executions and the desecration of bodies of captured enemy fighters in eastern Libya. This raises the question of whether the LNA, under Khalifa Haftar’s rule, and allied militias are bound by human rights law and therefore subject to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other human rights abuses. Beyond any reasonable doubt, the LNA and its allied militias are significant peace breakers, and Haftar repeatedly tried to gain control over Derna and Tripoli. Both sides in the conflict have committed various violations of IHL and IHRL, with numerous incidents reported on social media of torture and extrajudicial killings.
Human Rights Watch reported numerous war crimes and crimes against humanity. Mahmoud Mustafa Al-Werfalli, a senior commander of Al Saiqa, an elite unit of the Libyan National Army, was suspected of being liable for the war crime of murder in the execution of 33 prisoners and other torture crimes from June 3, 2016, to July 17, 2017. Since the LNA controlled Benghazi, they should bear responsibility for human rights abuses during the conflict with Benghazi rebels and terrorist groups.
In Tripoli, many human rights abuses were committed by rebels and other militias, who violated Libyan and international laws. Some militias were part of the government or pretended to be revolutionary groups backed by cities like Misrata and Zentan. Since these armed groups were government forces, the government in Tripoli should be liable for these abuses and violations and should prevent any human rights abuses. Regarding security and police enforcement, Tripoli has improved significantly, especially after the UN recognition of the Government of National Accord at the end of 2015.[16]
In Sirte, the ISS group violated HRL, IHL, and Libyan law. This terrorist group is recognized as an international mobile terrorist militia, and many countries have shared plans for defeating it. Do ISS groups have human rights obligations? It is difficult to evaluate whether groups like ISS are bound by human rights law. In a 2014 report to the Human Rights Council, the Special Rapporteur on human rights while countering terrorism suggested that persons who commit terrorist acts, “whether organized in armed groups or not, violate human rights.”[17] He stated, “Certainly, when viewed from a victim’s perspective, the mass killing of civilians, which is the objective of most terrorist campaigns, involves the deprivation of the most fundamental human right of all.”[18] There is a body of opinion that only states and comparable entities can violate human rights. In war crimes and crimes against humanity, HRL applies whether the violations were committed by states, ANSA, or individuals.
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Human Rights Obligations of Armed Non-State Groups in Non-Conflict Situations
After the withdrawal of the Al Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libya relied on rebels for security and police enforcement. While the majority of these force groups operated under the rule of law, there have been severe human rights abuses and violations, especially in Benghazi, Tripoli, and Derna.[19]
While a state is not responsible for acts committed by private entities or persons, it can be legally responsible at the international level for violations of international law committed by an ANSA if these conditions are met: the state exercised control over the ANSA, such that the ANSA acted under its direction, and the ANSA exercised elements of governmental authority. In 2014, some government-allied armed groups acting outside government control committed an unknown number of forced disappearances. The government made few efforts to prevent and investigate, but these were insufficient. In Warshfana County, seven miles south of Tripoli, kidnappings were common throughout 2014-2017. Media reports of several civil society activists kidnapped for political or ideological affiliations included those of blogger Abd Almouez Banoun, scientist and vocal anti-Islamist Fathi al-Farjoni, human rights activist Faraj Aboul-Isha, and civil society advocates Nader al-Gadi and Zakariah Abdalwahad. Many disappearances occurred in Benghazi.
The Libyan Constitutional Declaration states that authorities may not implement any punishment outside the law, and post-revolutionary legislation criminalizes torture. However, according to accounts collected by Human Rights Watch (HRW), both government and extralegal detention centers tortured prisoners. In October 2013, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) reported widespread torture in detention centers, particularly those managed by militias and armed brigades. In many cases, the government continued to rely on militias to manage incarceration facilities due to its lack of resources and capability. Furthermore, militias (not police) initiated arrests in most instances. Militias held detainees at their discretion before placing them in official detention facilities in Tripoli and Benghazi. Armed groups also managed their own detention facilities outside government control. Although the situation in West Libya has improved, the armed groups in Benghazi continue to violate the law and commit serious human rights crimes.[20]
According to Human Rights Watch reports released in July 2016, investigations into detention centers operated by the Libyan National Army and the Ministries of Justice and Interior found that 35 out of 73 detainees interviewed reported torture and other abuses, including severe overcrowding, poor sanitation conditions, and lack of access to adequate medical care in eight of the nine detention centers visited.[21] The investigation reported incidents of severe lashings, beatings, and electric shocks. In Benghazi, both HRW and Amnesty International also documented torture and other abuses, including whippings, beatings, electric shocks, overcrowding, dire sanitation conditions, and lack of access to medical care, in migrant detention centers.[22]
In brief, although human rights treaties do not contain explicit human rights obligations for non-state groups, international practice and conviction have emerged to hold such groups accountable to customary human rights law if they exercise control over territory. It is worth noting that international human rights law can complement international humanitarian law, especially regarding certain rights of political participation and social and economic rights. In a way, the more such armed groups resemble states, the more they become bound by IHRL. A further indication of states’ conviction that armed groups can have human rights obligations is a reference to human rights obligations for armed groups in international human rights treaty law. The human rights obligations of terrorist groups like ISS are controversial, and states have their own anti-terrorism laws.[23]
Non-State Armed Groups’ Obligations under International Humanitarian Law
It is worth noting that International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies only in conflict situations; if the conflict is between states, it is considered an international armed conflict, and if the conflict is between ANSAs or between ANSAs and a state, it is considered non-international or internal. A state can permit others, through what is called acceptance, to conduct certain operations, which would not change the classification of the conflict from internal to international.
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International Humanitarian Law Rules and Applicability
IHL covers the conduct of states and individuals in seeking to minimize suffering during wartime and deals with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict.[24] While there has been some external interference in the Libyan conflict since 2014, the conflict is mostly considered non-international.[25] Facts always matter in war situations, and it is extremely important to evaluate the nature of the conflict involving various war players, including external influences.[26] Since the end of 2014, warring groups have violated international law on several occasions.[27]
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Classification of Non-International Armed Conflicts
International humanitarian law recognizes two categories of armed conflicts defined in common Articles 2 and 3 of the revised Geneva Conventions of 1949: non-international armed conflict and international armed conflict.[28] There is no doubt that some countries are supporting militias and military groups, breaking the heart of International Humanitarian Law; however, there are not enough elements to change the characterization of the conflict to international.[29] Generally, classifying the conflict and the supporting legal analysis change from one category to another. International humanitarian law requires two elements for a conflict: the intensity of the violence and a sufficient degree of organization of the parties involved.
Non-State Armed Groups’ Obligations under International Humanitarian Law
International Humanitarian Law aims to cultivate inherent conduct in wartime, inspired by considerations of humanity and the mitigation of human suffering. It is not easy to classify a conflict involving multiple actors, but it is fair to say that the Libyan case is less complicated than Syria and Yemen.[30] The level of violence during the conflicts has reached the level of violating Humanitarian Law, International Law, and Libyan Law. The Law of Armed Conflict requires two elements for application: the intensity of the violence and the organization of the parties involved.[31]
A. The Importance of Holding Non-State Armed Groups Accountable
As discussed above, holding non-state armed groups accountable has practical advantages. Considering the violations and abuses committed by militias and other armed groups in Libya, it is clear that international law is moving toward holding non-state actors liable for human rights violations, especially with attempts to hold terrorist groups accountable. The question arises whether there is reasoning or rationale behind holding non-state actors accountable, especially as discussed above, that under IHL, once a conflict exists, all parties to the war are bound by the rules of Armed Conflict.[32]
Regarding the importance of holding NSAs liable under Human Rights law, several reasons support accountability. First, Human Rights Treaties exist to protect every human being’s dignity and are not primarily state obligations; therefore, human rights protect individuals against abuses, especially when armed groups control territory or work as allies to the government. Second, in reporting violations and abuses in an internal conflict like Syria, the reference needs to address misconduct by both the government and other armed groups.[33] This may entail practical consequences. For instance, Human Rights efforts in exposing the LNA group’s real face have helped the world identify violations and affected these non-state armed groups’ reputation. Even if Human Rights efforts did not stop external support, they helped the ICC collect evidence regarding the indictments of criminals.[34] Third, international law discussions on supplying weapons should address the prohibition of exporting weapons if they are used to commit or facilitate serious crimes of human rights law.
To sum up, militias and other non-state armed groups are subject to multiple legal regimes. While they are clearly bound by International Humanitarian Law during conflict, their conduct under Human Rights law is less clear. The Libyan case provides a clear example of weakness and controversy in the international community, where local politicians are immature and corrupt. Despite efforts by the United Nations and local mediators to settle the Libyan crisis, the positions of external actors remain negative. Libya has proven to be a tough case for achieving stability; since 2011, everything seems to conspire against stabilization. After years of war, lawbreakers and perpetrators remain free with immunity, and there have been no indictments despite several attempts by the ICC at the international level. This raises significant challenges for the international community regarding fairness and the need for new international treaties. Since 2014, Libya has experienced multiple overlapping non-international armed conflicts between armed groups supporting competing government institutions. Now, with the defeat of ISIS and other terrorist groups, there is a better chance for Libya to recover from the war and rebuild.
Therefore, to achieve this, Libya needs to adopt a constitution and reconciliation among all parties to the conflict. Solving the political conflict is key to moving forward and leaving the war behind. Libya should be seen as a nation confronting fragility, not as a battleground for terrorism. Foreign powers should understand this fragility and work to address its causes while assessing legitimate government. European and US domestic politics should not interfere with any stabilization plan in Libya. The Libyan case needs more diplomacy from regional and global actors. Although the war since 2014 has destroyed the bridge to stability and peace, there is currently a great chance for the international community to change its policy and for Libyans to stand up.
B. Recommendations
- Recognize Libya’s Fragility: Libya should be viewed not as a battleground for Daesh and regional powers but as a nation grappling with fragility, tribal conflicts, and widespread violence. Foreign powers need to acknowledge this and address the root causes of Libya’s instability, as neglecting this could ultimately harm their national interests.
- Minimize European and US Domestic Political Interference: Stabilizing Libya requires a long-term commitment, substantial financial resources, and a military presence on the ground. Political leaders must convey to their constituents the severe implications of Libya potentially becoming a ‘Somalia in the Mediterranean,’ emphasizing that there is no quick, low-cost, or low-risk solution.
- Enhance Diplomatic Engagement with Regional Actors: Diplomats must resolve political stalemates. The combined diplomatic influence of the European Union and the United States is significant. EU member states should collaborate to engage regional powers effectively.
- Integrate Post-Conflict Peacebuilding into Military Plans: A comprehensive, multidimensional post-conflict strategy is essential to ensure political and institutional development. Humanitarian, security, and development organizations should have the freedom to operate in Libya. Establishing a UN protectorate could be central to this strategy. Libya, despite its challenges, has the potential to become an example of successful multilateral peacebuilding if key actors collaborate on their roles and responsibilities.
[1] A Stable Libya Would Close the Door to Daesh by Giovanni Faleg :: SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2747879 (last visited Apr 5, 2018).
[2] Id
[3] United Nations Support Mission in Libya, UNSMIL, https://unsmil.unmissions.org/.
[4] Heidarali Teimouri & Surya P Subedi, Responsibility to Protect and the International Military Intervention in Libya in International Law: What Went Wrong and What Lessons Could Be Learnt from It? Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2018).
[5] Supra note 1.
[6] Jeannie L Sowers et al., Targeting environmental infrastructures, international law, and civilians in the new Middle Eastern wars, 48 Security DIALOGUE, 410–430 (2017).
[7] Khalifa Haftar ally Mahmoud al-Werfalli arrested 18 Aug 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/libya-khalifa-haftar-ally-mahmoud-al-werfalli-arrested-170818075333510.html
[8] Id.
[9] Heidarali Teimouri & Surya P Subedi, Responsibility to Protect and the International Military Intervention in Libya in International Law: What Went Wrong and What Lessons Could Be Learnt from It? Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2018)
[10] See it is available https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Militia
[11] Cordula Droege, The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 Isr. L. Rev. 310 (2007).
[12] Supra note 1.
[13] Kumar, Satish, et al. “The Human Genome Project: Where Are We Now and Where Are We Going?” Genome Mapping and Genomics in Human and Non-Human Primates, 2015, pp. 7–31., doi:10.1007/978-3-662-46306-2_2.
[14] Clapham, Andrew. “Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors in Conflict Situations.” International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 88, no. 863, 2006, p. 491., doi:10.1017/s1816383106000658.
[15] Human Rights Watch Report, 2016 See the report at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/libya
[16] Id.
[17] Michael P. Scharf “How the war against ISIS changed international law” AVAILABLE AT ,http://www.bing.com/cr?IG=5A47864D12C54B67A7DBEF38AFEC3F0B&CID=076FD361B0C06E9E1917D8A8B16F6FDF&rd=1&h=vXsGX1ToARxOa5V__AIwk-yTMOYOP4oEgt-
[18] Daragh Murray, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups, https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/human-rights-obligations-of-nonstate-armed-groups-9781509901630/.
[19] Human Rights Watch, Libya, HRW, https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/north-africa/libya.
[20] Guma El-Gamaty, “Can Haftar be indicted for war crimes?” https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/comment/2017/11/9/can-haftar-be-indicted-for-war-crimes
[21] Human Rights Watch, Libya, HRW, https://www.hrw.org/middle-east/north-africa/libya.
[22] Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
[23] RodenhÃuser, Tilman. “International Legal Obligations of Armed Opposition Groups in Syria.” International Review of Law, vol. 2015, no. 1, 2015, p. 2., doi:10.5339/irl.2015.2.
[24] Blank, Laurie R., & Gregory P. Noone. International Law and Armed Conflict: Fundamental Principles and Contemporary Challenges in the Law of War. Wolters Kluwer, 2016.
[25] Peskin, Victor, & Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski. “The Rise and Fall of the ICC in Libya and the Politics of International Surrogate Enforcership.” 10 International Journal of Transitional Justice 272-291 (2016).
[26] Sowers, Jeannie L., et al. “Targeting Environmental Infrastructures, International Law, and Civilians in the New Middle Eastern Wars.” 48 Security Dialogue 410-430 (2017).
[27] Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
[28] Victor Peskin & Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski, The Rise and Fall of the ICC in Libya and the Politics of International Surrogate Enforcership, 10 Int’l J. Transitional Just. 272, 272–91 (2016).
[29] Adrian Wallwork, Calling a Helpdesk, in Telephone and Helpdesk Skills 85, 85–88 (2014).
[30] Id.
[31] Id.
[32] Laurie R. Blank & Gregory P. Noone, International Law and Armed Conflict: Fundamental Principles and Contemporary Challenges in the Law of War (Wolters Kluwer 2016).
[33] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
[34] U.N. Human Rights Council Report: Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, U.N. Human Rights Council, Aug. 1, 2011–Apr. 2, 2012, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/14.
